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Abstract
By using their financial reserves efficiently, and thus smoothing shocks on
asset returns, pension funds can facilitate intergenerational risk-sharing. In
addition to the primary benefit it improved time diversification, this form
of risk allocation affords the secondary benefit of allowing the fund to take
better advantage of the equity premium, which also favors the consumers.
In this paper, our aim is twofold. First, we characterize the socially efficient
policy rules of a collective pension plan in terms of portfolio management,
capital payments to retirees, and dividend payments to shareholders. We
examine both the first-best rules and the second-best rules, where, in the
latter case, the fund is constrained by a solvency ratio and by a guaranteed
minimum return to workers’ contributions. Second, we measure the social
surplus of the system compared to a situation in which each generation would
save and invest in isolation for its own retirement. One of the main results
of the paper is that better intergenerational risk-sharing does not reduce the
risk born by each generation. Rather, it increases the expected return to the
workers’ contributions.
Keywords: dynamic portfolio choice, pension, retirement, intergenera-
tional risk sharing, financial intermediation.
1 Introduction
In competitive financial markets, the inability of current generations to share
their risks with those who are not born yet makes these markets inefficient.
This point was made by Diamond (1977), Gordon and Varian (1988), Ball
and Mankiw (2001) and Shiller (1999,2003) among others. In a funded sys-
tem with individual pension accounts, the absence of any intergenerational
sharing of individual portfolio risk implies that workers face high uncertainty
on their future pension wealth. In the recent past, many workers had to
reduce drastically their standard of living and to work longer after sizeable
downturns of financial markets. This inability of markets to allocate risk
efficiently across generations has been used to argue in favor of more pub-
lic intervention, in particular in the form of strenger pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
systems.1 However, the European experience with PAYG systems tells us
that organizing such risk sharing efficiently is subject to a strong political
constraint, since current generations are more reluctant to compensate losses
than to consume the surpluses of the system. Moreover, the expected return
of the PAYG is relatively low compared to the expected return of financial
markets.
The United States followed another road with their 1983 Social Security
Reforms. The so-called Greenspan Commission reforms involved imposing
a mandatory contribution from active baby-boom generations to partially
pre-fund their retirements.2 These federal trust funds have accumulated al-
most $3 trillion since then. The aim of this paper is to examine how and
by how much such a prefunded system can solve the intergenerational risk
sharing inefficiency. Such a funded system makes intergenerational risk shar-
ing possible if the trust funds can disconnect generational contributions to
generational pension benefits. But this, however, raises the question of which
rules should govern these implicit intergenerational cross-subsidizations. It
also raises the question of what the funds’ assets management strategy should
be. These two questions are jointly addressed in this paper.
The properties of ex ante Pareto-efficient rules for intergenerational risk
sharing have been examined in several recent papers. For example, Bohn
(2003) considers a general equilibrium model of a closed economy and show
1See for example Aaron, Blinder, Munnell and Orzag (2000), and Burtless (2000).
2The United Kingdom and the Netherlands implemented similar prefunded systems.
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that governments, by typically promising safe public pensions and issuing
safe debt, do not transfer enough risk on the shoulders of current retirees.
In the same vein, Krueger and Kubler (2002) show that when returns to
physical capital and human capital are imperfectly correlated, the consump-
tion variance of all generations can be reduced by implementing a PAYG
system in which pension benefits would be indexed on labor incomes. De
Menil, Murtin and Sheshinsky (2006) study ex ante Pareto improving social
security reforms when the return of individual saving accounts is uncertain,
assuming that transfers only from the young to the old can be implemented.
Van Hermert (2005) extends this analysis by considering a model with four-
state correlated risks on human and financial capital. He characterizes the
ex-ante Pareto efficient risk sharing rule within a standard PAYG system,
together with the households’ optimal portfolio allocation.
Contrary to the above-mentioned papers which focus on PAYG systems,
Cui, de Jong and Ponds (2005) examine a funded system with a realistic de-
scription of risks on financial markets. They compare the welfare implications
of various contribution and benefit policies of the fund, together with three
equity-bond ratios of the fund’s asset allocation. They conclude that funded
pension schemes that provide safer and smoother consumption streams are
welfare improving compared with pure individual pension schemes. More-
over, the 100% equity holding strategy of the fund dominates both the 50-50
bond/equity and the 100% bond strategies.
In this paper, rather than making welfare comparisons of existing policy
rules, we optimize jointly on the retirement benefit policy and on the fund’s
asset allocation strategy. Because we want to characterize operational rules
for a collective Defined Contribution (DC) fund, we consider in this paper
an OLG model in which each generation contributes to the fund for n = 40
periods, each period lasting one year. We describe an explicit intergenera-
tional risk sharing mechanism based on a transparent funded pension system,
and we measure the social surplus that this system generates compared to
a standard individual account DC scheme. Each year, a new generation of
workers starts contributing to the fund, and another generation leaves the
fund with a pension benefit that is endogenously determined. The pension
benefit is contingent on the level of the fund’s reserves.
Contrary to most existing papers with the notable exceptions of Cui, de
Jong and Ponds (2005) and van Hemert (2005), the choice of the portfolio is
endogenous to the model, and can be made contingent on the fund’s reserves.
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Another important difference with the existing literature is that we assume
that the government delegates the management of the scheme to a trust fund
controlled by shareholders. The shareholders bring equity to the fund when
it is created in exchange for future dividends. This deal is governed by a
participation constraint from the viewpoint of shareholders. By providing
capital to the system, the trust fund is able to offer portfolio insurance to
workers that takes the form of a minimum return to their savings. The
problem is to determine for each year and for each contingency, the optimal
portfolio of assets, the payment of benefits to the new pensioners, and the
distribution of dividends to the shareholders of the insurance company. The
trust fund is constrained by a solvency ratio, which guarantees that the
current market value of assets is always larger than the current market value
of the minimum liabilities to the contributing workers. The existence of such
a constraint has two central consequences. First, it reduces the ability of
the funded scheme to transfer risk to future generations. Second, it makes
the problem analytically intractable. As a, our results rely on a numerical
optimization procedure.
The most important message of this paper is that a better intergenera-
tional risk sharing scheme makes it socially efficient to raise the collective risk
exposure in order to take advantage of the large equity premium. When risks
are exogenous, the only benefit of intergenerational risk- sharing is to make
pension benefits safer, without changing the mean performance of savings. In
our model, risks are endogenous since the fund has the freedom to reallocate
its reserves between a risk free asset and a risky asset. The reform raises the
demand for equity. This additional collective risk exposure is only partially
offset by the better diversification. We then obtain the paradoxical property
that the better risk-sharing scheme raises the risk born by each generation!
Rather, the benefit of the reform comes from the larger expected pension
benefit offered to all current and future generations. In order to elucidate
this property, we consider a very simple two-period model in section 2.
Concerning the properties of the efficient management of the fund, we can
summarize our main findings as follows. First, the share of the fund’s wealth
invested in the risky asset is an inverted U-shaped function of the fund’s cash-
in-hand. Compared to the well-known Merton-Samuelson optimality rule of
a wealth-independent investment share in the risky asset, two additional
effects must be taken into account in our context. The first one is due to the
solvency issue, which forces the fund to drastically reduce its portfolio risk
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after a loss, when the solvency constraint becomes an issue. This explains
why the share of the fund’s financial reserves invested in the risky asset is
increasing with respect to low wealth levels. The second one comes from the
existence of the flow of future contributions which can be seen as a risk free
asset in the fund’s balance sheet. In order to maintain constant the share of
the risky asset in the fund’s total wealth as stated by the Merton-Samuelson
rule, the fund should invest relatively more in the risky asset at low levels
of cash-in-hand, and it should rebalance its portfolio in favor of the risk free
asset when the level of cash-in-hand increases.
Second, the benefit distributed to new pensioners is increasing and con-
cave in the market value of the fund’s assets. When solvency is an issue,
the distributed benefit above the contractual minimum is very sensitive to
the financial situation of the fund, which means that intergenerational risk
sharing does not work well in these circumstances. On the contrary, when
the fund is wealthy, the benefit distributed to the new pensioners is much
less sensitive to shocks on the market value of the fund’s assets. Two lessons
are derived from this observation. First, the intergenerational sharing of risk
is possible only when the fund has enough wealth to smooth financial shocks
across different generations of workers. The initial ratio of assets to liabili-
ties of the fund is a crucial aspect of this problem, which can be alleviated
by shareholders’ initial equity funding. Second, the efficient share of risk
that should be born by retirees depends upon the financial health of the
fund. This second conclusion differs greatly from the conclusion obtained in
a standard PAYG system in which there is no solvency issue. Indeed, when
there is no such issue, the efficient share of the aggregate risk that should be
born by retirees is independent of the history of past shocks.
We also measure the welfare gain of the improved risk sharing in the
economy. In order to perform this welfare analysis, we compare three long
term saving schemes. The first saving scheme, which is presented in section
3, is based on personal retirement accounts. Workers determine their opti-
mal portfolio risk in each period of their life, knowing that there will be no
solidarity across generations in the case of a financial downturn. We show
that it is optimal in this case for workers to invest a share of the balance
of their pension account that is decreasing with their age. Following this
dynamically optimal strategy yields a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
final level of retirement wealth, opening the door to useful intergenerational
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risk-sharing scheme.3 Assuming a risk free rate of 2% and a stocks’ excess
expected return of 3.9%, we show that following this optimal dynamic port-
folio strategy is equivalent in terms of expected utility of pension wealth to
a sure investment of lifetime savings at an interest rate of 3.33%.
The second long term savings scheme examined in section 4 yields a first-
best intergenerational risk sharing. It maximizes a discounted sum of the
expected utility of future generations subject to an intertemporal budget
constraint. It minimizes the solvency issue by just constraining the market
value of the fund’s assets to be nonnegative. The first-best solution is thus
quite unrealistic, but it is useful for measuring the maximum social surplus of
intergenerational risk-sharing. The first-best strategy consists in investing a
constant share of the fund’s total wealth in the risky asset, and to distribute
a constant share of the fund’s total wealth to retirees. The fund’s total
wealth is the sum of the current financial reserves and the net present value
of future workers’ contributions. The first-best solution yields a level of
intergenerational welfare that is equivalent to the one that would be obtained
by investing pension savings at a risk-free interest rate of 4.39%. Compared
to autarky, this represents a 30% increase in the certainty equivalent of the
pension benefits paid to all current and future generations.4 This shows the
potentially large welfare gain of intergenerational risk-sharing.
However, the main problem of the first-best solution is the possible fast
exhaustion of the financial reserves of the scheme and the potential resistance
of future generations to participate to the scheme as a consequence of such
circumstances. This is why in section 5, we examine in section 5 the more
realistic second-best pension scheme in which the pension fund is constrained
by a solvency ratio and by the requirement of a minimum rate of return
of 0% to its members. The second-best scheme yields an intergenerational
welfare that is equivalent to a 3.83% sure rate of returns on savings. This
still represents a 12.7% increase in the certainty equivalent pension benefits
3Poterba, Rauh, Venti and Wise (2003) evaluate the risk to retirement wealth of the
100/0, 50/50 and 0/100 age-independent allocation strategy in 401(k) plans, using a
stochastic simulation algorithm. They conclude that the 100% investment in equity over
the entire lifetime makes pension wealth very uncertain but optimal (if the investor has
some non-401(k) wealth) because of the large equity premium.
4When considering intergenerational risk sharing, the relevant concept of efficiency is
that of ex-ante Pareto-efficiency. See Demange and Laroque (1999) and Demange (2002)
for other concepts of efficiency with overlapping generations.
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compared to autarky.5
2 The surplus of risk sharing when risks are
endogenous: A simple model
In order to evaluate the social surplus of intergenerational risk sharing, let
us consider a very stylized model with two agents. They have the same von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(z) = z1−γ/(1 − γ), where γ is the
index of relative risk aversion. The initial wealth of agent i, i = 1 or 2, is
denoted wi. Agent i can invest in two assets, one being risk free with a zero
return, and the other being risky with return exi. We assume that ex1 and ex2
are independent and identically distributed with mean µ > 0 and variance
σ2. In autarky, each agent selects the dollar investment α that maximizes
the expected utility of final wealth:
max
α
Eu(wi + αexi) ' uµwi + αµ− 1
2
γ
wi
α2σ2
¶
. (1)
Suppose that the portfolio risk is small, so that the Arrow-Pratt approxima-
tion can be applied. Obviously, the solution of this program is:
αi =
µ
γσ2
wi. (2)
Plugging this solution into (1), we can evaluate the certainty equivalent payoff
of the optimal portfolio as
CEQi = αiµ−
1
2
γ
wi
α2iσ
2 =
1
2
µ2
γσ2
wi.
As a first step in measuring the social surplus of risk sharing, let us
assume that the two agents decide to share risk ex1 efficiently, the individual
risk exposure αi being fixed at their autarky level. Given our small risk
assumption, such risk transfer can be characterized by a linear function
t(x1) = t0 + ηα1x1 that determines the transfer from agent 1 to agent 2 as
5Given the differences in the modeling strategies, this estimation is reasonably compa-
rable to the one by van Hemert (2005), who estimated the welfare surplus to be 5.14% of
the consumers’ human capital.
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a function of the realization of ex1. Again using Arrow-Pratt approximations,
we get that the social surplus associated with bearing of risk α1ex1 equals
CEQ(η) = α1µ−
1
2
γ
w1
(1− η)2α21σ2 −
1
2
γ
w2
η2α21σ
2
=
µ2
γσ2
½
w1 −
1
2
∙
w1(1− η)2 +
w21
w2
η2
¸¾
.
The optimal risk sharing rule η∗ is the one that maximizes CEQ(η). It is
easy to check that the optimal sharing η∗ equals w2/(w1+w2), and that the
maximum social surplus equals
CEQ(η∗) = CEQ1
w1 + 2w2
w1 + w2
.
When the two agents have the same wealth, the certainty equivalent payoff
associated with investment in ex1 is increased by 50%.
But there is an additional benefit to extract from the efficient risk sharing,
since the ability to pool risk ex1 across agents should induce them to accept
more of that risk. To explore this question, let us assume that the two agents
determine simultaneously how much risk to undertake and how to share it:
max
α,η
CEQ(α, η) = αµ− 1
2
γ
w1
(1− η)2α2σ2 − 1
2
γ
w2
η2α2σ2.
It is easy to check that the optimal solution of this problem is still η∗ =
w2/(w1 + w2) and
α∗ =
µ
γσ2
(w1 + w2). (3)
Observe that the demand for the transferable risk ex1 is increased com-
pared to autarky. The ability of the two agents to share a given risk increases
the demand for that risk. Sot, it is as if the agent’s wealth that was originally
protected form risk had been transferred to the initial risk-bearer. Equiva-
lently, it is as if agent 2 would have a direct access to the investment on riskex1 through the efficient risk-sharing scheme with agent 1. Notice also that
agent 1 increases the demand for his risky asset by a factor (w1 + w2)/w1,
but because he retains only a fraction w1/(w1 + w2) of the risk, he ends up
with exactly the same risk exposure. On the other side, agent 2 retains the
same exposure on ex2 and accepts some risk from agent 1, thereby bearing
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more risk than in autarky. In fact, everything works as if agent 2 were to
subrogate the purchase of α2 units of risk ex1 to agent 1. Agent 1 purchases
this optimal amount of risk ex1 and transfers it to agent 2 through the agreed-
upon risk-sharing scheme. Globally, the better sharing of risk in the economy
induces everyone to end up with at least as much risk as in autarky. Still,
the social surplus is positive since we have that
CEQ(α∗, η∗) = CEQ1
w1 + w2
w1
. (4)
The social surplus of the ex1 risk-taking opportunity is increased by a factor
(w1 + w2)/w1. For two equally wealthy agents, this is a 100% increase in
surplus. The benefit of the risk sharing is not to reduce risk, but rather to
increase the expected payoff from the risky investment. Our main finding in
this section is that the ability to diversify risk induces people to accept more
risk so that only part of the additional risk is offset by diversification. In
short, when individual risks are endogenous, the access to risk sharing leads
people to increase their expected wealth, not to reduce their risk!
The easiest application of this model is to the international diversification
of individual portfolios, where i = 1 and i = 2 are two countries with inde-
pendent economic growth processes. In the context of this paper however,
i = 1 and i = 2 are two disconnected periods, where the growth process of
the economy exhibits no serial correlation. The risk-sharing in that context
takes a form of whereby the earlier generation contributes to the economy’s
aggregate capital accumulation by consuming less than its net production, in
order for the future generation to consume more than what it will produce.
Of course, this transfer can be contingent only upon the information avail-
able during the lifetime of the first generation. Thus, the first generation
cannot bear some share of the second generation’s risk, which implies that
only risk ex1 can be shared. When we consider a specific (pension) fund to
serve as a medium for these intergenerational transfers, the sharing of risk
across generations is limited by the solvency of the fund. This is the central
issue analyzed in this paper.
3 Optimal individual saving accounts
The economy is composed of overlapping generations of a fixed size that is
normalized to unity. Each generation contributes to a pension fund during
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n = 40 years. The yearly contribution y is paid out by the active workers
at the beginning of the year. We are in a context of defined contributions,
which implies that y is exogenous to the model. At the end of the nth
year, the old generation receives a benefit whose level is endogenous to the
model. This retiring generation is replaced by a young generation which starts
contributing to the fund. This means that n contributing generations coexist
in the fund, which receives ny monetary units at the end of each period. The
welfare of a generation is measured by the expected utility that it obtains
from consuming the pension benefit at the retirement age. The workers’
utility function u is increasing and concave in the pension benefit b.
There are two financial assets in the economy, one of which is risk-free.
Asset returns are unpredictable. The gross yearly return of the risk free
asset is constant over time and is equal R. In our calibration, we consider an
interest rate of 2% (R = 1.02). The excess return of the risky asset in year
t is denoted ext. There is no serial correlation of returns over time, so thatex1, ex2, .. are independent and identically distributed. R and ex are exogenous.
In particular, we assume that they are not affected by the architecture of
the pension system, as would be the case in a small open economy. We
calibrate our model with the empirical distribution of the real yearly return
of the SP500 in excess of the risk-free rate over the period 1963-1994. The
expected real excess return is Eex = µ = 3.9%, and the standard deviation is
σx = 13.6%.
As a benchmark, we examine an economy in which there is no risk shar-
ing. The fund can be interpreted in that case as a collection of n individual
saving accounts. In this model, each generation can be considered in autarky.
At the beginning of each of the n contribution years, the generation has to
determine how much of its reserves to invest in the risky asset with the rest
being invested in the risk-free asset. Let αt denote the monetary investment
in the risky asset at the beginning of the tth contribution year, t = 1, ..., n.
The financial reserve of a generation from contribution year t− 1 to contri-
bution year t is denoted wt. The individual dynamic portfolio problem can
be written as
Uaut = max
α1,...,αn
Eu(eb) (5)
s.t. w1 = 0;
wt+1 = R(wt + y) + αtext, t = 1, ..., n;
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eb = wn+1.
In this paper, we assume that workers have constant relative risk aversion
equaling γ, so that u(b) = b1−γ/(1 − γ). We take a relatively conservative
position by assuming that γ = 5.6 In that case, the solution to this dynamic
portfolio problem is well-known since Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969).
It is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal dynamic portfolio strategy of an individual sav-
ing account is such that
αt = a
aut(wt + ht), with a
aut = a∗R (6)
for t = 1, ..., n, where wt is the value of the portfolio at the beginning of period
t, ht = Σ
n−t
i=0R
−iy is the residual net present value of future contributions, and
a∗ is the unique positive solution of the equation Eex(1 + a∗ex)−γ = 0. When
measured from the beginning of the first period, the optimal expected utility
at retirement age equals
Uaut =
£
R1−γE (1 + a∗ex)1−γ¤n ¡Pn−1i=0 R−iy¢1−γ
1− γ . (7)
Proof: See Appendix 1. ¥
The optimal investment in the risky asset at any time t is a constant
proportion a∗R of the household’s total retirement wealth, which is defined
as the sum of the value wt of the portfolio and of the residual Net Present
Value (NPV) of the future contributions. This reflects the well-known fact
that myopia is optimal under constant relative risk aversion: the time horizon
has no effect on the share of the investor’s total wealth to be invested in the
risky asset. For the numerical value of our benchmark case, we estimate that
a∗ = 39.6%, so that the optimal share of the total retirement wealth to be
permanently invested in the risky asset is 2% larger, i.e., aaut = 40.4%.
Notice that the share of the current balance of the individual account
invested in the risky asset equals
αt
wt
= aaut
µ
1 +
ht
wt
¶
.
6This implies that workers are ready to pay as much as 2.4% of their wealth to eliminate
a fifty-fifty risk to gain or loose 10% of their wealth.
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It is usually decreasing with age, since the balance wt of the pension account
will be typically increasing with age, whereas the NPV, ht, of future contribu-
tions is decreasing with age. Thus, whereas it is optimal to invest a constant
share of total pension wealth in equity, it is usually optimal to reduce the share
of current financial wealth invested in equity when approaching retirement
age. This argument has been proposed by Bodie, Merton and Samuelson
(1992) to justify the standard recommendation to reduce portfolio risk when
growing older.7
When following this optimal investment strategy, the retirement wealth
is distributed as eb = Rnh1 nY
t=1
(1 + a∗ext).
Using this equation, one can check that the expected retirement wealth is
thus equal to Rn(1 + a∗µ)nh1 = 113.7y, whereas the standard deviation of
retirement wealth equals Rn [(E(1 + a∗ex)2)n − (1 + a∗µ)2n]h1 = 39y.
Proposition 1 also gives us the expected utility Uaut of the retirement
capital in autarky, as measured when the household starts to save. We
define the certainty equivalent final wealth Baut as the sure pension wealth
that yields the same expected utility for the retiree as the random pension
wealth eb that is obtained by following the optimal portfolio strategy (6):
u(Baut) = Uaut. We obtain
Baut = Rn
£
E (1 + a∗ex)1−γ¤ n1−γ n−1X
i=0
R−iy.
In our benchmark case, we obtain Baut = 84.1y. The constant flow of saving
optimally invested in financial markets over the n = 40 years preceding
retirement yields the same expected utility for the retiree as receiving an
amount of capital 84 times the yearly saving rates at retirement age. This
means that the psychological cost of risk — or the risk premium — equals
29.6y. We can also define the certainty equivalent rate of return on saving
as the interest rate raut on saving that yields the expected utility Uaut :
u
Ã
40X
t=1
y(1 + raut)t
!
= Uaut. (8)
7Other arguments for and against a decreasing age-profile of the optimal assets alloca-
tion are discussed in Gollier (2005).
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Under our numerical specification, we obtain a certainty equivalent rate of
return raut = 3.33%. The ability to invest in stocks raises the certainty equiv-
alent rate of return on savings from the risk-free rate of R−1 = 2% to 3.33%.
This return is still far away from the expected rate of equity, which is assumed
in our calibration to be equal to 5.9%.
To end this section, observe that the optimal investment strategy is diffi-
cult to implement when credit markets are inefficient. Indeed, at the begin-
ning of his first year of contribution, the worker should invest aauth1 = 11.27y
in the risky asset, whereas he has only y on his pension account at that time.
This means that implementing the optimal strategy would require the worker
to borrow more than 10 times his current pension balance to invest in equity.
Because this is unrealistic, we consider a constrained version of program ( 5)
where we add the constraint that the investment in the risky asset can never
exceed the current balance of the pension account: αt ≤ wt+y, t = 1, ..., n.
A simple (myopic) rule-of-thumb is that the worker invest the unconstrained
optimum αt = a∗R(wt + ht) as long as the no-borrowing constraint is not
binding, and to be 100% in equity when it is binding:8
αt = min(aaut(wt + ht), wt + y). (9)
The no-borrowing constraint is likely to be binding early in the consumers’
contribution period of consumers, and to be slack once the worker has ac-
cumulated enough financial reserves in his pension account. We estimated
numerically the certainty equivalent pension wealth and the certainty equiva-
lent return of this individual pension saving. We got respectivelyBaut = 81.9y
and raut = 3.23%. These values are not significantly different from the un-
constrained case.
It appears that the uncertainty on the final wealth available to the retiree
is large, in spite of the important rebalancement of portfolios in favor of the
risk-free asset as investors get closer to retirement. In order to measure the
riskiness of the pension wealth at retirement age in autarky, we performed
8We are aware of the fact that this myopic strategy is not the optimal one under the no-
borrowing constraint, as shown by Grossman and Vila (1992). Even if the constraint is not
binding today, the risk that it could bind in the future has an effect on the optimal current
portfolio allocation. However, given the fast decreasing NPV ht of future contributions, the
probability of this event occurring is small. Indeed, we solved numerically the constrained
version of the program and found no difference between the optimal solution and the
rule-of-thumb strategy.
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a simulation of 100,000 random scenarios of n years of yearly performances
of the equity market. Our findings are summarized in Figure 1, where we
draw the frequency table of final pension wealth. The smallest and the
largest pension wealth levels in these scenarios have been 28.12y and 446.7y,
respectively, with an average value of 103.7y and a standard deviation of
32.1y. The upper limit on the share of wealth that can be invested in the
risky asset decreases with both the mean and the standard deviation of the
retirement wealth.
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
This shows that there is ample room for intergenerational risk sharing
in this economy. It is noteworthy that, as explained by Samuelson (1963),
there is no time-diversification of the portfolio risk going on in this personal
retirement system. The portfolio risk taken in year 1 is not diversified away by
the portfolio risk taken over the n− 1 remaining years. Diversification could
exist here only through an intergenerational scheme, in which one generation
exchanges half of its lifetime portfolio risk with half of the portfolio risk borne
by another (distant) generation.
4 First-best intergenerational risk sharing
In this section, we consider the viewpoint of a hypothetical social planner
who is strong enough to commit all future generations to contribute to a
collective Defined Contribution pension system. We thus abstract from any
consideration about the potentially opportunistic behavior of future genera-
tions. In short, we will characterize a first-best solution. Our aim here is to
estimate the maximum welfare gain that can be attained through intergen-
erational risk sharing. Of course, this first-best solution is unrealistic. This
is why we will consider a second-best solution in the next section.
Suppose that at time t = 0, the n current generations agree to transfer
their individual saving accounts to a pension fund that would be allowed
to reallocate risks across generations. Let Y0 denote the value of this initial
transfer. It depends upon the realized returns of the risky asset during the last
n years. We hereafter assume that Y0 equals the average wealth accumulated
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by the different generations coexisting in year t = 0, so that
Y0 =
nX
t=1
Ewt, (10)
where Ewt is the expected wealth accumulated by the generation in contribu-
tion year t in autarky. Using the model of the previous section, we obtained
numerically that Y0 equals 1638y. In this section, we assume that contri-
butions to the fund by future generations are compulsory. The net present
value of these future contributions equals
K =
∞X
t=0
R−tny =
nyR
R− 1 . (11)
In our calibration, we obtain that K equals 2040y.
Let wt be the market value of all assets owned by the fund at the end of
year t−1. At the beginning of year t, the fund collects the savings y of the n
contributing generations. It also distributes the benefit bt to the generation
which just retired at the end of the previous period. As before, αt is the
money investment in the risky asset by the fund in year t. In Figure 2, we
represented these flows in year t.
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE
We measure the social welfare of the overlapping generations of workers
by the discounted sum of the flow of expected utility generated by consuming
their pension wealth at retirement. Consider the decision problem of the fund
at the beginning of period 0. We look for the dynamic contingent strategy of
the fund, both in terms of the distribution b and the portfolio management
α that maximize the welfare of the overlapping generations of workers:
Ufb = maxE
" ∞X
t=0
βtu(ebt)# (12)
subject to
w0 = Y0
wt+1 = R (wt − bt + ny) + αtext, ∀t ≥ 0;
wt +K ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 1,
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with w0 = Y0, and where β is the discount factor used by the social planner
to weight the welfare of the different generations. Observe that we allow the
fund to value the flow of future contributions, so that the market value of all
”assets” of the fund equals wt +K, which is constrained to be nonnegative.
It happens that the solution of this program is well-known.
Proposition 2 The first-best benefits distribution and assets allocation are
such that
bfb(w) = m(w +K) with m = 1−
¡
βR1−γE [1 + a∗ex]−γ¢1/γ , (13)
and
αfb(w) = afb(w +K), with afb = R(1−m)a∗, (14)
where a∗ solves Eex(1+a∗ex)−γ = 0. Moreover, the expected growth rate of the
fund’s financial wealth constant and equal to
E [wt+1 +K | wt]
wt +K
= R(1−m)(1 + a∗µ). (15)
When measured from the date at which the reform takes place, the intergen-
erational welfare equals
Ufb =
m−γ(Y0 +K)1−γ
1− γ . (16)
Proof: See Appendix 2. ¥
The optimal strategy of the fund is characterized by two policy functions
b and α such that bt = b(wt) and αt = α(wt). These two functions can
be interpreted as an explicit contract among the different generations that
stipulates how much risk will be accepted, and how these risks will be al-
located over time. We see that these functions are linear with the market
value wt of fund’s assets. In fact, both the pension benefit and the risky in-
vestment can be expressed as constant shares of the fund’s aggregate wealth,
which includes both the value wt of the financial assets and the NPV K of
the promised future contributions to the fund. As proposed for example by
Valde´s-Prieto (2005), the idea is to explicitly include this additional asset in
the balance sheet of the fund by securitizing the flow of future contributions
on financial markets.
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The only parameter that remains to be selected is the discount factor
β, which governs the relative generosity of the system between current and
future generations. Observe that the choice of β influences the share m of
the aggregate wealth of the fund to be distributed to the current retirees. A
larger β implies a smaller m, and a larger growth rate of the fund’s expected
wealth to be distributed to future generations. We propose to choose β in
order that the growth rate of the fund’s wealth be exactly zero in expectation,
thereby being ”fair” across generations. Combining equations (13) and (15),
we obtain that
β =
£
R(1 + a∗µ)γE(1 + a∗ex)−γ¤−1 .
In our calibration exercise, this means that β = 0.9374. This implies that the
aggregate wealth of the fund follows a martingale, and the financial shocks
on its reserves are permanent.9 This also implies that all present and future
generations have the same expected retirement benefit conditional on the
information available at the time of the reform.
Every year, the fund should distribute to the retiring generation a con-
stant share m = 3.43% of the aggregate fund’s wealth. This means for
example that a generation bears only 3.43% of the portfolio risk taken by
the fund the year before this generation retires, thereby illustrating the in-
tergenerational risk sharing of the scheme. The optimal portfolio strategy is
to invest a constant share afb = R(1 − m)a∗ = 39.0% of the fund’s aggre-
gate wealth in the risky asset.10 Because the aggregate wealth includes the
net present value K of the flow of future contributions, this implies that the
demand for risky assets is much increased by the improved intergenerational
risk sharing arrangement. This is perfectly in line with the conclusion of
Section 2, where we showed that the efficient sharing of risk has the same
effect on the demand for equity as the transfer of wealth of the future gener-
ations to the current ones. Under the system of individual pension accounts
presented in the previous section, we have estimated numerically the av-
9For any β larger than 0.9374, the social planner will take advantage of the large assets
returns by accumulating more reserves over time. The wealth of the pension fund would
therefore be non-stationary.
10The difference between aaut = 40.4% and afb = 39% just comes from the fact that, in
the first-best solution, the fund must pay an immediate benefit to the retiring generation.
If we base our computations on the fund’s after-benefit-payment wealth, we would have
that the share of aggregate wealth to be invested in equity would be exactly the same in
the two cases: a∗R = 40.4%.
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erage demand for the risky asset,and we obtained E [
Pn
t=1 α
aut
t ] ' 932.7y.
The day the reform is implemented, the demand for the risky asset jumps
to αfb(Y0 + K) = 1434.4y. This represents a 54% increase in the demand
for the risky asset. Because risks are better diversified in the economy, it is
socially efficient to accept more risk in the economy.
Conditionally on the information available at the date of the reform, the
retirement benefit paid to the generation retiring at date t is distributed as
ebt = m(Y0 +K)Rt(1−m)t tY
i=1
(1 + a∗exi). (17)
As mentioned earlier, because of our choice of β, the mean of ebt, which equals
m(Y0 + K) = 126.2y, is time-independent. On the contrary, its standard
deviation m(Y0+K)Rt(1−m)t [(E(1 + a∗ex)2)t − (1 + a∗µ)2t] is growing with
the time horizon. For example, the young generation entering the labour
market just at the time of the pension reform and retiring in 40 years faces
a standard deviation equaling 43.6y, and this number goes up to 54.1y for
the generation that will retire 20 years after, in 60 years. In Figure 3, we
have drawn the empirical distributions of the pension benefits paid to these
two generations. These results should be compared to the case of autarky, in
which the mean pension wealth is 105.8y, and its standard deviation is 39y.
These results are in line with the properties of the simple risk sharing model
that we developed in Section 2. Namely, the benefit of the intergenerational
risk sharing does not translate into less risk borne by each generation. Rather,
the intergenerational sharing of risk induces an increase in the demand for
the risky asset, thereby increasing the expected return of their portfolio and
the overall performance of the pension fund.
INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE
Finally, using (16), we can measure the impact of the first-best intergen-
erational risk sharing scheme on intergenerational welfare. As in the previous
section, it is easier to measure the certainty equivalent constant benefit Bfb
distributed to all future generation that yields the same intergenerational
welfare: Ufb = u(Bfb)/(1− β). In our calibration, we obtain Bfb = 108.8y,
a benefit that should be compared to what generations obtain in autarky,
Baut = 84.1 y. The first-best solution yields a social surplus which is equiv-
alent to a 29% increase in the benefits paid to all future generations of pen-
sioners. In terms of the certainty equivalent interest rate on savings, using
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a formula equivalent to (8), we obtain that rfb = 4.39%. This is a consider-
able increase compared to the certainty equivalent interest rate obtained in
autarky: raut = 3.23%.
However, this social surplus is not shared equally among the future gener-
ations. Indeed, seen from the day of the reform, all future generations enjoy
the same expected pension benefit, but the generations living in the distant
future face a larger uncertainty about their pension benefit than the current
generations. It implies that the reform is in fact relatively more favorable to
the current generations, given their risk aversion. To see this, we can define
the certainty equivalent bfbt of the generation retiring at date t, conditional on
the information available at date t = 0, as u(bfbt ) = Eu(ebt). Using equation
(17), we obtain that
bfbt = q
tbfb0 with q = R(1−m)
¡
E(1 + a∗exi)1−γ¢ 11−γ (18)
and bfb0 = m(Y0+K).We obtain q = 0.9926 with the value of our parameters.
This means that, seen from t = 0, the certainty equivalent pension benefit
decreases at a rate of 0.75% per year. This implies that the reform makes
generations living in the very distant future ex-ante worse off, and the reform
is therefore not ex-ante Pareto-improving.11
As is usual in most dynamic risk sharing arrangements, there is a possible
commitment problem. Because of the large portfolio risk taken by the fund,
successive adverse shocks on financial markets can dramatically reduce the
funds’ reserves in such a way that young workers may prefer to switch back
to an individual pension system. To examine this question, we determine
the certainty equivalent pension benefit bfb(w) for a young worker who starts
contributing to the system in year t given the financial reserve w of the fund
at that date:
u
¡
bfb(w)
¢
= E
h
u(ebt+n) |wt = wi (19)
= m1−γ
£
R1−γ(1−m)1−γE(1 + a∗ex)1−γ¤n (w +K)1−γ
1− γ .(20)
A commitment problem arises for the young generation entering into the
system if bfb(w) is smaller than the certainty equivalent pension in autarky
11The ex-ante Pareto-superiority of the reform would require selecting a larger discount
factor β. But that would imply that the fund’s reserves would increase without bound in
expectation.
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Baut = 84.1y.We derived numerically that this happens when reserves w are
smaller than 1250y. In spite of the fact that the initial reserves Y0 = 1638y
much larger than this minimum, such a situation is quite likely to occur
at the same point in the future. For example, based on a simulation over
100000 random scenarios, we estimated that the probability that the level of
reserves w40 be smaller than 1250y forty years after the reform is 42%.
5 Second-best intergenerational risk sharing
The first-best intergenerational risk sharing scheme is hardly politically sus-
tainable if a succession of negative shocks on financial markets arises early
in the life of the fund. In particular, the fund may need to offer a negative
return on contributions in order to restore its future attractiveness in the
future. In this section, we add a few additional constraints to the system in
order to make it less sensitive to this political sustainability problem.
5.1 The second-best constraints
The key additional element that we add in the system is a constraint on
the minimum return that must be given to workers. The fund guarantees a
minimum gross return Rmin to workers on their savings. This guaranteed min-
imum return of the fund can be interpreted as a portfolio insurance scheme.
It implies that the minimum benefit paid to the new retirees is
bmin =
nX
i=1
yRimin. (21)
Because of this guarantee, the fund is also constrained to maintain at all
times and in all states a minimum capital wmin which is the guaranteed
capital accumulated by the current contributing generations. The solvency
check is made at the beginning of the year, after pensions and dividends have
been paid, but before contributions have been received. This means that if,
for any reason, the fund has to interrupt its activities, the current market
value of its assets would be enough to repay the contributions paid in the
past by the currently active workers, in addition to a return Rmin on these
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savings. This implies that wmin equals
wmin =
n−1X
j=0
"
n−jX
i=1
yRimin
#
=
yRmin
Rmin − 1
µ
Rmin (Rnmin − 1)
Rmin − 1
− n
¶
. (22)
The last equality holds only if Rmin is not equal to unity. When Rmin = 1,
we simply have that wmin = yn(n + 1)/2. In our benchmark calibration,
we assume that the fund must guarantee a minimum return of 0% on the
workers’ contributions, i.e., Rmin = 1. Combining this with n = 40, we obtain
that the minimum capital requirement is wmin = 820y. The minimum benefit
paid to retirees is bmin = 40y.
We consider an economy in which a shareholder company manages the
pension fund. Shareholders live forever and have an increasing and concave
utility function v on the dividends dt that are paid to them by the fund at
the beginning of each year. To make things comparable with the first-best
solution, we assume that shareholders have the same attitude towards risk as
workers: v ≡ u. Because the shareholders’ marginal utility tends to infinity
when the dividend tends to zero, it is never efficient that shareholders bring
more equity to the fund.
At date t = 0, the new pension scheme is created and is funded with the
combination of equity e0 from shareholders and of initial contributions Y0
from the n generations of workers living at that time, so that w0 = e0 + Y0.
As in the previous section, we assume that Y0 equals 1638y. There is a
competition among insurers to determine who will manage the fund in the
future. This implies that v0 equals the expected utility that insurers can
obtain by investing e0 directly on financial markets, or that
v0 = maxE
" ∞X
t=0
βtv(edt)#
s.t. et+1 = R (et − dt) + αtext, ∀t ≥ 0;
et ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 1.
¿From the previous section, we know that this problem has an analytical
solution, yielding
v0 =
m−γe1−γ0
1− γ . (23)
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Given this shareholders’ utility reservation level v0, consider now the de-
cision problem of the fund at the beginning of period 0, given its financial
reserves w0 = e0+Y0 ≥ wmin. We look for the dynamic contingent strategy of
the fund, both in terms of distribution and portfolio management, that max-
imizes the welfare of the overlapping generations of workers, subject to the
participation constraint (25) of the shareholders of the fund, the minimum
benefit constraint, the solvency constraint and the no-borrowing constraint:
Usb = maxE
" ∞X
t=0
βtu(ebt)# (24)
s.t. E
" ∞X
t=0
βtv(edt)# ≥ v0; (25)
w0 = Y0 + e0 (26)
wt+1 = R (wt − bt − dt + ny) + αtext, ∀t ≥ 0; (27)
bt ≥ bmin, ∀t ≥ 0; (28)
wt ≥ wmin, ∀t ≥ 0; (29)
αt ≤ wt − bt − dt + ny, ∀t ≥ 0. (30)
This maximization program is well-behaved and has a feasible solution if
R is larger than Rmin. The optimal solution is referred to as the second-
best strategy. Because this program has no analytical solution, we hereafter
rely on a numerical algorithm to describe the second-best strategy. Using
Mathematica c°, we solve the problem by backward induction using 200 iter-
ations, starting from the first-best value function. In Table 1, we summarize
the value of the exogenous parameters of the model.
γ = 5 : constant relative risk aversion of workers and shareholders;
β = 0.9374 : discount factor;ex : excess return of the risky asset (Eex = 3.9%; σx = 13.6%);
R = 1.02 : gross interest rate;
Rmin = 1.00 : gross guaranteed minimum return on contributions;
wmin = 820y : minimum value of assets of the fund;
Y0 = 1638y : initial contribution of workers at t = 0;
e0 : initial equity of the insurance company at t = 0.
Table 1: Parameter values in the calibration
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5.2 The allocation of risk between workers and share-
holders
For any positive scalar λ, define the function bu(.;λ) as follows:
bu(c;λ) = max
b
u(b) + λv(c− b) s.t. b ≥ bmin. (31)
It is easily shown that bu(c;λ) is increasing and concave in c, and that the
solution b(c;λ) of this program is increasing in c. Moreover, it is immediate
that we can rewrite program (24) as
U sbλ = maxc,α
E
" ∞X
t=0
βtbu(ect;λ)# (32)
s.t. w0 = Y0 + e0
wt+1 = R (wt − ct + ny) + αtext, ∀t ≥ 0;
wt ≥ wmin, ∀t ≥ 0;
αt ≤ wt − ct + ny, ∀t ≥ 0,
where λ is selected in order to satisfy the shareholders’ participation con-
straint (25) as an equality, i.e.,
E
" ∞X
t=0
βtv(ect − b(ect;λ))# = v0. (33)
Taking the initial equity e0 and the induced shareholders’ reservation level
v0 computed from (23), the natural methodology would be to find the λ that
solves (33). Because the solution of program (32) is itself a function λ, this
would be a difficult problem to solve numerically. We reverse-engineered this
strategy by solving program (32) with an arbitrary (but cleverly chosen) λ,
and by computing the corresponding shareholders’ reservation level v0 using
equation (33) and the initial equity level e0 using equation (23).
By decomposing program (24) into programs (31) and (32), we disen-
tangle the dynamic accumulation and risk-taking problem (32) of the fund
from the purely static problem (31). Program (31) is a standard cake-sharing
problem which determines how the total yearly payment c of the fund in any
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given year should be shared between a benefit b to workers and a dividend
d = c−b to shareholders. Because u and v exhibit the same constant relative
risk aversion, the first-best risk sharing rule would be to allocate a fixed pro-
portion k ∈ [0, 1] of the payment to workers: ebt = kect, with k = (1+λ1/γ)−1.
As explained above, we hereafter fix k = 90% (yielding λ = 1.69 × 10−5),
and we derive the corresponding equilibrium equity e0 brought by sharehold-
ers when the fund is created. We obtain e0 = 356y. This is a relatively
marginal amount compared to the initial funding by the existing generation,
which was assumed to be Y0 = 1638y, and to the NPV K = 2040y of future
contributions.
The presence of the guaranteed minimum return of workers’ contributions
implies that the second-best risk-sharing rule between workers and sharehold-
ers takes the following form:
ebt = max(bmin, kect). (34)
The second-best contract offers a constant share k of the total yearly payment
of the fund to the retiring workers, as long as this pension benefit is larger
than the guaranteed minimum bmin. The dividend paid to shareholders equalsedt = min(ect−bmin, (1−k)ect). It is noteworthy that the indirect utility functionbu exhibits a constant relative risk aversion γ = 5 as long as the minimum
return constraint is not binding. When this constraint is binding, workers
do not participate to the sharing of the portfolio risk, thereby raising the
relative risk aversion of the syndicate. This relative risk aversion goes up to
plus infinity when the total payment c goes down to bmin.
The shareholders of the fund thus provide portfolio insurance to the
workers. They get a premium for this service. Indeed, their contribution
e0 = 356y represents only 8.82% of the total initial value of the fund, which
is e0 + Y0 + K = 4034y. But they have a right on 10% of the distributed
earnings, as long as the fund is financially healthy.
5.3 The benefit policy and the dividend policy
In this section, we examine the second-best strategy of benefit payment to the
retiring generation. This benefit is a function of the level of financial reserves
of the fund at the retirement date: bt = bsb(wt). We have seen that the first-
best benefit policy function was bfb(w) = 0.0343w + 69.97. In Figure 4, we
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depicted the second-best benefit distributed to retiring workers as a function
of w. When the market value of the assets of the company is approaching
the minimum reserve level 820y, it is optimal to limit the benefit paid to
the retiring workers to its minimum guaranteed level bmin = 40y. Otherwise,
the benefit is increasing and concave in w. For very large values of w, the
second-best benefit converges to its first-best level. The second-best benefit
is always smaller than its first-best level: bsb(w) ≤ bfb(w) for all w. The
difference is particularly important when the fund’s financial health is much
deteriorated.
INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE
This illustrates the fact that the financial reserves of the fund are used as
a buffer stock a` la Deaton (1991) to organize the intergenerational sharing
of risk. The level of the buffer stock must be well-enough enough above wmin
to make it feasible and efficient under the solvency constraint of the fund.
This provides an additional incentive for the fund to reduce the distribution
of benefits when w is close to wmin. This reduction of the benefit paid by the
fund in bad times is an effort made in the short run that is helpful to restore
the efficiency of the fund in the long run.
The uncertainty about the pension benefits that the fund will pay in
the future depends upon the time horizon under consideration. In Figure 5,
we depicted the distribution of the benefits paid to the generation retiring
respectively 40 and 60 years after the reform. These distributions were ob-
tained by performing 10000 random simulations of 60 years of equity returns,
starting with a fund’s initial reserve equaling Y0 + e0. The mean pension
benefits are 106.2y and 107.5y for the population retiring in 40 and 60 years,
respectively. The standard deviations are respectively 35.8y and 44.5y.
INSERT FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE
The second-best strategy to distribute dividends to the shareholders of
the insurance company is depicted in Figure 6. When the minimum return
constraint is not binding, the second-best dividend equals (1−k)/k = 11.11%
of the benefit paid to retiring workers, as explained in the previous section.
When this constraint becomes binding, shareholders must drastically reduce
their dividend. Because shareholders provide portfolio insurance to workers,
they are highly exposed to the downside risk on the performance of the
fund. In theory, it could be useful to ask shareholders to provide additional
equity when the fund’s financial health becomes critical. This is allowed in
our model since we do not restrict the dividend to be positive. However, a
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negative dividend would not be renegotiation-proof. We escaped this problem
by assuming that the utility function of the shareholders is CRRA, which
implies that a negative dividend can never be optimal. This implies that
shareholders contribute to the financing of the system only up-front, so that
they always have the incentive to control the system. In addition, their
exposure to the downside risk of the fund provides an additional incentive
for the shareholders to efficiently manage the fund’s assets.
INSERT FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE
5.4 The investment policy
The second-best investment in the risky asset in year t is a function of the
market value of the assets of the fund at that time: αt = αsb(wt). This opti-
mal strategy is described in Figure 7. It should be compared to the first-best
investment αfb(w) = a∗(w +K), which is characterized by a constant share
of the risky asset in the total wealth of the fund, including the market value
K of future contributions. Of course, this first-best strategy is not feasi-
ble in the second-best context, since the fund would take too much risk in
a financially stressed situation. Following the first-best investment strategy
would yield an important insolvency risk. The reduction of the risk expo-
sure in these situations guarantees the solvency of the fund at the cost of
a significant reduction in the expected performances of the fund’s portfolio.
The solvency constraint reduces the ability of the fund to time-diversify the
portfolio risk, thereby making it more risk-averse at low wealth levels. It is
as if the fund exhibited decreasing absolute risk aversion, as explained by
Epstein (1983) and Gollier (2002).
INSERT FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE
In Figure 8, we have drawn the investment in the risky asset as a fraction
of the financial reserves of the fund, not taking into account the NPV of
future contributions. The first-best share αfb(w)/w = a∗(w + K)/w is a
decreasing hyperbola. Indeed, the fund should take into account of the flow
of future contributions, which can be interpreted as a risk free asset in the
fund’s balance sheet. Therefore, at low levels of the financial reserves w, the
fund should invest a relatively large fraction of its cash-in-hand, w, in the
risky asset in order to compensate for the existence of this risk free asset in
the fund’s total wealth. This effect is diluted at larger levels of the fund’s
financial reserves. The second-best investment strategy αsb(w)/w described
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in Figure 8 combines the solvency effect already exhibited in Figure 7 and
the effect of the safe flow of future contributions. It has an inverse U shape
with a maximum at 56% when the fund’s reserves are around 2.5 times its
minimum level. It tends to afb = 39.0% when the fund’s reserves tends to
infinity.
INSERT FIGURE 8 AROUND HERE
5.5 The dynamics of reserves accumulation
In the first-best solution, we have seen that the fund’s level of financial re-
serves is a martingale in the sense that the growth of the fund’s expected
wealth is zero. The discount factor β has been selected to obtain this property
of the first-best solution. Two contradictory effects influence this rate in the
second-best context. First, because the distribution of benefits to retirees is
less generous (bsb(w) < bfb(w)), the second-best fund accumulates reserves
faster. This positive effect is particularly strong at low wealth levels. Second,
the second-best investment strategy is more precautionary than the first-best
one. This reduces the expected portfolio return of the fund. This negative
effect on the rate of accumulation is also particularly strong at low wealth
levels. In Figure 9, we have drawn the expected rate of increase of the fund’s
financial reserves as a function of w. We see that the second-best expected
growth rate is always positive, but it tends to zero for high levels of reserves.
When the financial health of the fund is much deteriorated, this rate can be
as large as half of one percent per year. This illustrates the fund’s willing-
ness to escape the solvency problem that would inhibit intergenerational risk
sharing.
INSERT FIGURE 9 AROUND HERE
In Figure 10, we have drawn the 5%, 50% and 95% percentiles of 60.000
simulated paths of the fund’s reserve over the first 100 years of the fund.
We already know that the expected level of the fund’s reserve is constant
over time. This figure tells us that the distribution of the fund’s reserve is
positively skewed. This is the consequence of the optimal investment and
distribution strategies, in which the fund becomes extremely prudent when
the fund’s reserve tends toward its lower solvency limit.
INSERT FIGURE 10 AROUND HERE
Let us consider the effect of a negative excess return of x = −10% of
the risky asset on the flows generated by the fund. Suppose first that this
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negative shock occurs in year t = 0, when w = Y0 + e0 = 1994y. From this,
the fund paid b0 = 106.5y to new retirees and d0 = 11.9y to shareholders.
Because it collected 40y in contributions from workers, the fund’s reserves
amounted to 1915.6y, from which αsb = 1083y has been invested in the
risky asset. With a return of −10% on this investment, the return of the
fund’s portfolio at the end of year t = 0 is thus equal to 0.02(1915.6y) −
0.1(1083y) = −70y. The financial reserves at the beginning of the second
year equal w1 = 1845.6y, a 7.44% reduction from the previous year. It yields
a reduction of the pension benefit to the generation retiring at the beginning
of year t = 1 to b1 = 100.8y, a 5.35% reduction compared to the pension
paid to the previous generation. The demand for the risky asset is reduced
by 8.4%. In Table 2, we computed these values when the adverse shock
occurs in other circumstances. The net effect of the financial shock on the
fund reserves is increasing in the market value of its assets. This illustrates
the fact that the fund takes proportionally more portfolio risk at high wealth
levels.
w = 1000y w = 1994y w = 3000y
∆w/w −3.88% −7.44% −7.38%
∆b/b −4.90% −5.35% −5.36%
∆α/α −19.71% −8.40% −6.73%
Table 2: The short-term effect of a negative excess return x = −10% on
reserves (∆w/w), pension benefits (∆b/b) and the demand for stocks
(∆α/α). These short-term effects are evaluated for three different initial
levels w of the fund’s reserves.
5.6 Welfare analysis
The discounted value of the flow of generational expected utilities at date
t = 0 equals Usb. As before, we measure the certainty equivalent constant
benefit Bsb distributed to all future generations that yields the same inter-
generational welfare: Usb = u(Bsb)/(1 − β). We obtain Bsb = 94.8y. This
is better than the certainty equivalent pension Baut = 84.1y obtained in au-
tarky, but much worse than the certainty equivalent pension Bfb = 108.8y
obtained in the first-best context. The second-best pension system improves
welfare, but the constraints imposed on it imply that only 43% of the po-
tential social surplus of intergenerational risk sharing. In terms of certainty
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equivalent return on savings, we obtain rsb = 3.83%, which is in between
raut = 3.33% and rfb = 4.39%.
An alternative approach consists in estimating the welfare of any specific
generation conditional on the fund’s reserves when this generation starts
contributing to the pension fund. Parallel to what we have done in the first-
best context, we define the conditional certainty equivalent benefit bsb(w)
as
u(bsb(w)) = E
h
u(ebt+n) |wt = wi . (35)
The right-hand side of this equality can be numerically estimated by using
backward induction. The outcome of these computations is depicted in Fig-
ure 11. We see that bsb(w) is smaller than bfb(w) for all w. This means that
the second-best fund is less attractive than the first-best fund for new workers
at all reserves levels, because of the inefficient intergenerational risk sharing.
We also see that new workers prefer to save on their own when the fund’s
reserves at the time of their first contribution is less than wsus = 1905y.12
This is called the ”minimum sustainable reserve”. Notice that the initial re-
serve Y0 + e0 = 1994y exceeds the minimum sustainable reserve, so that the
fund is attractive for the founding generations. However, there is no guaran-
tee that the fund’s assets value will permanently remain above wsus. If the
participation in the fund is on a voluntary basis, when wt is less than wsus,
the new generation entering in year t would not accept to contribute to the
fund unless a tax incentive for long-term savings is offered. For example, in
the most critical situation with wt = 1000y, the certainty equivalent benefit
distributed by the second-best fund is equal to bsb(1000y) = 59.1y, which is
29% smaller than the certainty equivalent benefit obtained in autarky. A tax
incentive of this order would be necessary to make the second-best pension
scheme sustainable.
INSERT FIGURE 11 AROUND HERE
6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we perform some sensitivity analyses of the second-best pen-
sion scheme. The parameters of the model are β (the discount factor),
Rmin (the guaranteed minimum gross return), R (the risk-free rate), ex (the
12Notice that wsus is defined by u(bsb(wsus)) = Uaut.
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distribution of the stock returns), γ (relative risk aversion), and e0 (the ini-
tial equity). As explained in section 5.2, there is a one-to-one relationship
between e0 and v0 (equation (23), and between v0 and the share k of the
yearly payment of the fund that is allocated to the retiring generation, with
the remaining 1− k being paid to shareholders. Numerically speaking, it is
much easier to fix k as an exogenous choice variable, and to derive on the
e0 that is compatible with this k at equilibrium. We have seen earlier that
our benchmark initial equity e0 = 100y is compatible with the distribution of
k = 90% of the yearly fund’s payment to workers. In our sensitivity analy-
sis, we fix k = 90% and we select the initial equity e0 that is compatible
with this k. Table 3 summarize our findings. The different lines of this
table are self-explanatory, except the line referred to as E(wt+1 − wt)/wt.
As seen in Figure 9, the expected yearly change in the fund’s assets value
depends upon the state variable w. On this line, we report its asymptotic
value R(1−m) [1 + a∗Eex]− 1.
Second
best
benchmark
β = 0.937
↓
β = 0.9
Rmin= 100%
↓
Rmin= 90%
k = 90%
↓
k = 80%
ex
↓ex−1%
certainty equivalent return
rsb
3.83% 4.09% 4.07% 3.91% 3.37%
initial reserve
Y0+e0
1994y 1968y 2015y 2455y 1723y
initial risky investment
α0
1083y 970y 1290y 1332y 798y
initial pension benefit
b0
106.5y 120.6y 114.6y 109.7y 85.3y
initial dividend
d0
11.9y 13.4y 12.7y 27.4y 9.5y
FB growth rate of reserve
E(wt+1−wt)/wt
0% −0.8% 0% 0% 0%
min sustainable reserve
wsus
1905y 2198y 1728y 2281y 1619y
Table 3: Effect of a reduction of the discount factor β, of a reduction of the
guaranteed gross return Rmin, of a reduction of the share k of the fund’s
total yearly payment accruing to retirees, and of a leftward translation of
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the distribution of excess returns ex.
• Reduction of β from 0.9374 to 0.9: The current generations are favored
by this reduction of the discount factor. The benefit paid to the retir-
ing workers during the first year of the fund is increased, together with
the dividend paid to shareholders. Because risks are less efficiently al-
located across generations, the fund reduces its exposure to portfolio
risk. All these changes converge towards the fact that the expected
yearly change in the fund’s assets value be reduced with respect to the
benchmark. In fact, the expected change becomes negative. Finan-
cial reserves converge in expectation to wmin. Because of its generous
benefits paid early to retiring workers, the fund is beneficial for inter-
generational risk sharing only in the short and medium terms. In the
long term, the financial reserves of the fund cannot be used as a buffer
stock to smooth shocks across generations, because of the solvency con-
straint.
• Reduction of Rmin from 100% to 90%: Reducing the guaranteed min-
imum return on savings is good for the intergenerational sharing of
risks. This change has a sizeable impact on the certainty equivalent
return of the pension scheme. Because shareholders are less exposed
to the downside financial risk, the equilibrium initial equity e0 is in-
creased. The optimal portfolio risk exposure is also increased, because
this risk is shared more efficiently with future generations. This yields
an increase in the benefits paid to new retirees and to shareholders.
• Reduction of k from 90% to 80%: Increasing the share of the fund’s
portfolio return accruing to shareholders raises the equilibrium equity
initially invested in the fund by shareholders. Because the initial value
of the fund’s assets is much above the legal minimum to satisfy the
solvency constraint, the fund is in a better situation to organize an
efficient intergenerational risk sharing. The certainty equivalent return
on savings is thereby improved compared to the benchmark. The share
of the fund’s assets invested in stocks, the benefit paid to new retirees
and the dividend paid to shareholders are all increased.
• Deterministic reduction of stocks returns by 1%: This change in ex-
pectations dramatically reduces both the investment in the risky asset
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and the certainty equivalent return on savings. Because of the reduced
return on savings, the willingness to accumulate wealth over time is
reduced. In fact, a decumulation process arises under these values of
the parameters, as in the case of the reduction of β. Notice that this
translation of the distribution of excess returns also affects the work-
ers’ welfare in autarky, yielding a reduction of the certainty equivalent
pension wealth to Baut = 73.2y, and of the certainty equivalent interest
rate to raut = 2.75%.
7 Concluding Remarks
The aims of this paper were twofold. First, we wanted to characterize oper-
ational rules for a pension fund to optimize both the sharing of risk across
generations and the dynamic portfolio management of this fund. We showed
that both the asset allocation of the fund and the promised pension benefits
should be contingent upon the fund’s assets to liabilities ratio. The target
share of the fund’s assets to be invested in equity should be around 40 and
50%, but this share should be drastically reduced when the financial health
of the fund deteriorates. The target share of the fund’s reserves to be distrib-
uted as pension benefits should be around 3.5%, but this share of pension
benefit distributed to retirees should go down to the minimum guaranteed
level when the solvency constraint becomes an issue.
Second, we wanted to estimate the welfare gain of intergenerational risk
sharing. Compared to a purely individual retirement system, we showed that
organizing a first-best intergenerational risk-sharing scheme has an effect on
the welfare of all current and future generations that is equivalent to an
increase by more than 1 percentage point in the return on their retirement
savings. However, this welfare gain is halved when solvency constraints are
imposed to the pension fund to reinforce the long-term political sustainability
of the scheme.
Many proponents of the preservation of the PAYG system argue that
this system, contrary to a funded system, is able to implement an efficient
intergenerational sharing of risk. Contrary to this view, we have shown in
this paper that a cleverly built, transparently funded system can do much to
bolster the risk-sharing efficiency of a limited public intervention program.
Our work is also useful to refine an argument long used by proponents of
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radical changes in social security schemes. According to their view, the
PAYG system should be abolished due to its low rate of return. The problem
is to determine to which rate of return of the funded system should it be
compared. If it is compared to the real risk-free rate, which has been around
1.5% in the U.S. and around -1% in France during the twentieth century,13
the argument is not very strong. If it is compared to the average real return
on equity, which has been around respectively 7% and 4% in the U.S. and
in France, the argument would be much stronger. Some proponents of the
funded system claim that this alternative comparison is the relevant one,
because of the ability of the pension fund to time-diversify equity risk. Using
a calibration based on U.S. financial data, we have shown that this argument
is only partially true, and that the implementation of the realistic second-best
pension scheme has a certainty equivalent rate of return around 4.4%.
This paper attempts to provide a realistic estimation of the welfare gains
of intergenerational risk sharing. However, to make the model tractable, we
made several simplifications compared to real pension schemes. Therefore,
the paper could obviously be improved in many directions. First, we assumed
that the risk-free rate is constant over time and that future stocks returns are
unpredictable. We recognize that these two assumptions are important, but
quite unrealistic. Long term financial intermediaries are very sensitive to the
interest rate risk and this should be treated formally in a future extension
of this work. Introducing predictable changes in the two assets returns will
make the second-best benefit policy function dependent on the additional
state variables of the system, in particular on the current interest rate. The
pension benefit policy function and the optimal management of the fund’s
assets will be sensitive to changes in these additional state variables. Second,
we considered for simplicity a defined contribution scheme. It would be useful
to see how a more flexible contribution rule would be useful for a better
sharing of risk over time. We should also take into account the diversity
of tastes and preferences (that are affected by the number of dependants)
among the consumers, as well as the possibility of premature death. Third,
one could consider more sophisticated portfolio insurance rules, such as the
one consisting in ”locking in” successive benefits to active members of the
fund. This would be a third-best approach.
13For a synthesis of financial returns during the last century, see Dimson, Marsh and
Staunton (2000).
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
By backward induction, we can rewrite program (5) as
vt(w) = max
α
Evt+1(R(w + y) + αex),
for t = 1, ..., n, together with vn+1(w) = w1−γ/(1− γ) and Uaut = v1(0). The
solution αt of this program is a function αt(w) of the single state variable w.
Let us consider the trial solution function vt+1(w) = Kt+1(w+ht+1)1−γ/(1−
γ), for some positive scalar Kt+1 and where ht = Σ
n−t
i=0R
−iy. Notice that it
implies that
vt+1(R(w + y) + αex) = Kt+1 (R(w + y) + αex+ ht+1)1−γ
1− γ
= Kt+1
(R(w + ht) + αex)1−γ
1− γ
The first-order condition for the above program can thus be written as
Kt+1E
£ex(R(w + ht) + αt(w)ex)−γ¤ = 0.
It is immediate that this is true only when αt(w) = a∗R(wt + ht) where a∗
solves Eex(1 + a∗ex)−γ = 0. It implies in turn that
vt(w) = Kt+1E
"
(R(w + ht) +R(w + ht)a∗ex)1−γ
1− γ
#
= δKt+1
(w + ht)1−γ
1− γ ,
where δ = R1−γE(1 + a∗ex)1−γ. Thus, our trial solution is correct, with Kt =
δKt+1. This implies that
Uaut = v1(0) = K1
h1−γ1
1− γ
= δn
h1−γ1
1− γ .
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. ¥
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. By
backward induction, we can rewrite program (12) as
v(w) = max
b,α
u(b) + βEv(R (w − b+ ny) + αex).
Let us consider the trial solution function v(w) = q(w +K)1−γ/(1− γ), for
some positive scalar q. Notice that it implies that
v(R(w−b+ny)+αex) = q (R(w − b+ ny) + αex+K)1−γ
1− γ = q
(R(w − b+K) + αex)1−γ
1− γ
The first-order conditions for the above program can thus be written as
u0(b) = βRqE
£
(R(w − b+K) + αex)−γ¤ ,
and
qE
£ex(R(w − b+K) + αex)−γ¤ = 0.
It is easy to check that b(w) = bm(w +K) and α(w) = a∗R(1− bm)(w +K)
solves this system, with bm = (kq1/γ +1)−1 and k = (βR1−γE(1+ a∗ex)−γ)1/γ.
Replacing the functions appearing in the following equality
v(w) = u(b(w)) + βEv(R (w − b(w) +K) + α(w)ex)
by their expressions assumed above, we obtain that
q = bm1−γ + βqR1−γ(1− bm)1−γE(1 + a∗ex)1−γ.
Because E(1 + a∗ex)1−γ = E(1 + a∗ex)−γ, this equation can be rewritten as
q = (kq1/γ + 1)γ−1 + kγq
µ
kq1/γ
kq1/γ + 1
¶1−γ
= (kq1/γ + 1)γ−1
£
1 + kq1/γ
¤
= (kq1/γ + 1)γ.
It implies that q = m−γ and m = bm. Thus, our trial solution is correct. This
implies that
Ufb = v(Y0) = q
(Y0 +K)1−γ
1− γ = m
−γ (Y0 +K)
1−γ
1− γ .
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Finally, we have that
E [wt+1 +K] = R(wt − bt + ny) + αtEex+K
= R(wt +K)−Rm(wt +K) +R(1−m)a∗µ(wt +K)
= R(1−m) [1 + a∗µ] (wt +K).
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. ¥
Appendix 3: Numerical method to characterize the second-best
solution
In order to characterize the second-best solution, we proceed numerically
by backward induction. We first fix the share k of the total annual payment
accruing to retirees. This yields the associated λ = ((1 − k)/k)γ and the
indirect utility function bu defined by equation (31). This eliminates the
risk sharing aspect of the problem between shareholders and workers. The
remaining problem to solve is program (32). It can be rewritten as
V (w) = max
c,α
bu(c) + βEV (R(w − c+ ny) + αex)
subject to w ≥ wmin and α ≤ w − c+ ny. We consider its dynamic version:
Vt(w) = max
c,α
bu(c) + βEVt+1(R(w − c+ ny) + αex) (36)
subject to the same constraints. We start with the initial value function
borrowed from the first-best solution:
VT (w) =
m−γw1−γ
1− γ .
Using this specification, we numerically solve program (36) for t = T−1. We
discretize w in interval [wmin, 20wmin ] by step ∆w = wmin/1000. For each
of the corresponding w, we solve program (36), and we obtain VT−1(w). We
use this value function to solve this program for t = T − 2. We iterate this
process 150 times. It converges if β is small enough.
During this procedure, we compute the discounted expected utility of
both pension benefits and dividends, as functions of the fund’s reserve. At
the end of this converging process, we compute the initial equity e0 which
equalizes v0 to the discounted expected utility of the flow of dividends, given
the initial reserve Y0 + e0.
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Figure 1: Frequency (in %) of final pension benefits b = wn+1 in autarky.
 
αt : investment in the risky asset 
xt: return of the risky asset wt 
bt : pension 
ny : contributions 
wt+1 
Figure 2: Financial flows in year t.
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Figure 3: Frequency (in %) of final pension benefits ebfbt under the first-best
pension mechanism. The white and black bars are for people retiring t = 40
and t = 60 years after the reform, respectively.
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Figure 4: The first-best pension benefit (dashed) and the second-best pension
benefit (plain) as a function of the fund’s reserve w. The shaded rectangle
correspond to the minimum reserve constraint w ≥ wmin = 820.
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Figure 5: Frequency (in %) of final pension benefits bsbt under the second-best
pension mechanism. The white and black bars are for people retiring t = 40
and t = 60 years after the reform, respectively.
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Figure 6: The second best dividend paid to the fund’s shareholders as a
function of the fund’s reserve w.
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Figure 7: The second-best investment in the risky asset expressed as a frac-
tion of the total wealth of the fund w + K. The dashed line describes the
first-best investment strategy.
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Figure 8: The second-best share of the fund’s reserve w invested in the risky
asset, as a function of w. The dashed curve describes the first-best strategy.
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Figure 9: The expected yearly rate of increase of reserves as a function of
the fund’s reserve, in the second-best context.
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Figure 10: The 5%, 50% and 95% percentiles of 60.000 simulated paths of
the fund’s reserve w over the first 100 years of the fund, in the second-best
context.
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Figure 11: The certainty equivalent benefit b conditional to the fund’s reserve
w at the beginning of the worker’s contribution period, for the first-best,
second-best and autarky contexts.
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